THis is not the place in which to enquire too nicely whether Error escaped from Pandora's box, or from the depths of the Styx, or lastly whether he is to be accounted one of the sons of Earth who conspired against the gods. This much, however, is clear to the least observant, that by imperceptible degrees, like Typhon of old or Neptune's son Ephialtes, he has grown to such portentous size that I believe Truth itself to be menaced by him. For I see that he often fights on equal terms against the goddess Truth, I see that after sustaining losses he is richer, after being wounded he is sound and whole, after being vanquished he is triumphant over his vanquishers, like the Libyan Antaeus in the ancient tale. So far has this gone, that one might with good reason doubt the correctness of Ovid's well-known poem, and question whether Astraea was really the last of the immortals to quit the earth; for I fear that many centuries later Peace and Truth too came to loathe mankind and abandoned it. For assuredly no one could be persuaded into believing that if Truth were still a visitor to the earth, one-eyed and near-sighted Error could look upon her, the co-equal of the sun, without being altogether blinded and cast back once more into that lower world from which he originally came forth. But there can in fact be no doubt that Truth has fled away to her home in heaven, never to return to hapless man; and now foul Error reigns supreme in all the schools, and has seized the power, as it were, with the help of a strong and active body of supporters. With this added strength, and swollen past endurance, he has assailed every particle and fragment of natural philosophy and outraged it with impious claws, even as, we are told, the Harpies defiled the table of Phineus, King of Arcady.

The thing has come to such a pass that the richest dainties of philosophy, sumptuous as the feasts which the gods enjoy, now only disgust those who partake of them. For it often happens that a student who turns the pages of the philosophers' books and is busied about them day and night departs more puzzled than he came. For whatever one writer has affirmed and believes that he has established by a sufficient argument, another confutes, or at least seems to confute, with the greatest ease, and both are able almost indefinitely the one to find objections, the other replies. The wretched reader meanwhile, continually rent and torn in pieces as if between two wild beasts, and half dead with boredom, is at last left as at a cross-roads, without any idea which way to turn. But, to be quite candid, it may not be worth while to spend the trouble which is demanded in finding out on which side the truth really lies; for in fact it is very often about questions of the most trifling importance that the most heated disputes of the forces of philosophy occur.

But I seem to catch a whisper of "What is he driving at now? He attacks Error, while he himself wanders erratically all over the world." I confess that I have indeed erred and strayed, which I should not have done had I not hoped much from your kindness.

Well, I must now gird myself up to the task before me; and may the goddess Lua (as Lipsius says) grant me a happy deliverance from all my difficulties.

The problem which is set us to enucleate today is whether in the destruction of any substance there can be a resolution into first matter. This is usually expressed in other words, whether any accidents which were in the corrupted substance remain also in that generated from it"—that is to say, whether when the form perishes all accidents which had previously existed in the composite perish also.

There is a wide divergence of opinion about this on the part of philosophers of great repute. Some vehemently assert that such a resolution does take place, others fight tooth and nail against its possibility. I am inclined to agree with these last, and am led to differ fundamentally from the former first by reason, as I believe, and secondly by the authority of so many eminent men. It remains for me shortly to attempt to supply a proof. I shall do so as briefly as possible, and first of all as follows.

If there is resolution into first matter, it follows that we are wrong in asserting the essential proposition with regard to first matter, namely that it is never found pure. Our opponents will hasten to reply: This is said in respect of form. Well, let us grant these sciolists that substantial forms are never found apart from accidental ones.

But this is a minor point, and does not go to the root of the question; we must use stronger arguments.

First then let us see whether we have any of the ancient philosophers on our side. Even as we ask, here comes Aristotle of his own accord to meet us, and ranges himself on our side, together with a chosen band of his commentators. And pray note, my hearers, that it was at Aristotle's own instance and instigation that this battle was begun, and that, I hope, under good auspices. He does in fact himself seem to hint at exactly our view, in Metaph. 7, Text 8, where he says that quantity is first of all inherent in matter. If anyone refuses to accept this dictum, I shall not hesitate to indict him for heresy, in accordance with the law of all the sages. Moreover, he elsewhere plainly regards quantity as a property of first matter, which most of his followers also assert; but who would tolerate the forcible separation of a property from its subject, even on the pronouncement of a judge appointed by themselves?

But now, let us come to close grips with the question, and weigh carefully what reason suggests.

The assertion, then, is proved first by the argument that matter has an actual proper entity in consequence of its own proper existence, and therefore is capable of having quantity, at any rate the quantity called indeterminate. There is also the argument sometimes confidently put forward that form is only received into matter through the medium of quantity.

Secondly, if an accident is destroyed, it can only be destroyed in one of the following ways—either by the introduction of a contrary, or by cessation of its term, or by the absence of some other conserving cause, or, lastly, by the defect of the proper subject in which it inheres. Quantity cannot be destroyed in the first way, since it has no contrary; the second way does not apply, since it is proper to relatives; nor by the absence of a conserving cause, for that which my opponents assign is form. Now accidents are conceived to depend upon form in two ways—in the genus of formal cause, or in that of efficient cause; the first kind of dependence is not immediate, for substantial form does not inform accidents, nor is it conceivable that a cause can have any other function in regard to them in this genus. Therefore it is only mediate, that is to say in so far as matter is dependent upon form, and quantity in turn on matter. The second kind of dependence is in the genus of efficient cause; but whether accidents are dependent on form or not in this genus is doubtful. But even if we grant that it is so, it still does not follow that when the form perishes the accidents also perish with it, because when that cause fails another similar one succeeds it immediately, which is completely sufficient to maintain precisely the same effect, and that without interruption. Finally, that quantity and other similar accidents are not annihilated by the defect of the proper subject is proved thus—the subject of quantity is either a composite or form or matter; now it is clear that it is not a composite, because an accident which is in a composite attains by its union both matter and form by means of one thing; but quantity cannot by any means attain a rational soul, for this is spiritual and entirely incapable of the formal effect of quantity, that is to say, of quantitative extension. Further, it is sufficiently clear from what has been said that form is not the subject of quantity. It follows therefore that only matter can be the subject of quantity, and so all inference of destruction is excluded in regard to quantity.

As regards the example of a scar commonly adduced, I consider it to be a very cogent argument; for no one could so force my credulity as to make me believe that it is quite other in the corpse than what it was just before in the living body, since there is neither reason nor necessity to correct our sense, which is indeed rarely deluded concerning its proper object. I would far rather listen to marvellous stories of ghosts and hobgoblins than to the foolish and futile yappings of these crazy philosophasters about the re-creation de novo of these accidents of theirs. Now we know for certain that heat and those other qualities of an animal which are capable of increase and decrease are precisely the same at the moment of death, and also after death; why then should these be destroyed when others like them are to be produced? Besides, if they were to be produced afresh they would not last so short a time, for they would not reach their utmost intensity suddenly, but only gradually and little by little. Remember too that it is a very ancient axiom that quantity follows matter and quality form.

I might, indeed I ought, to have dwelt longer on this question. I cannot tell whether I have bored you, but I have certainly bored myself to extinction. It remains for me to deal with my opponents' arguments. May the Muses grant that I may reduce them to first matter, if that be possible, or rather to nothing at all.

As to their first point, Aristotle's testimony in saying that no sensible subject remains in generation, we reply that this should be understood as applying to the complete and integral subject, that is to say, to the substantial composite, as the ancient and learned author Philoponus bears witness. Secondly, regarding Aristotle's statement that matter is neither what, nor how much, nor of what kind; by this it is not meant that matter has no quantity nor quality, but that it does not include either quantity or quality of itself or in its own essence. Thirdly, Aristotle says that when the first substances are destroyed all accidents are destroyed. We do not deny that this will happen, provided you grant that another may immediately succeed that which was destroyed.

Finally, he says that form is received into pure matter; that is, by the purity of the substantial form.

Now the fight grows fierce, and victory hangs in the balance, for they renew the battle and attack us as follows: Since matter is pure potentiality, it has no being except that which it gains through the form it has borrowed; hence it has no power of itself to support accidents, unless at the least it is conjoined by nature to form, to which it is indebted for its being. This error they usually amend thus—that first matter has its own proper being, which may indeed be incomplete in the genus of substance, but as compared with accident may not unreasonably be called simply being. They object moreover that matter has regard to substantial form as its first act, but to accidents as its second act. I reply that matter has regard to form, first in the order of intention, but not of generation or execution. Our argument now begins to bubble and boil, and our opponents press harder upon us, as in mortal combat, as thus: Every property flows actively from the essence of that of which it is a property; but quantity cannot do so, for this flow is a form of activity, but matter has in itself no activity, being merely passive; therefore, etc., etc. I reply, that the natural combination of matter with quantity can be understood in two ways, first by reason of the passive potentiality alone within its own nature, which demands such an affection: for there is no necessity that every innate property should be attributed to a subject by reason of its active principle; since sometimes the passive suffices, in the way in which many consider that motion is natural to the heavens. Secondly, it can also be understood as being due to its intrinsic active flowing forth, since it contains in itself true and actual being.

But my opponents have not even yet lost all hope of victory; for they are making a second attack, inferring from this that form is combined with matter through the medium of quantity, since it is inherent in first matter. We, on the other hand, absolutely refuse to accept this inference, and in order to maintain our position unimpaired in spite of it, we draw this distinction, that form is combined with matter through the medium of quantity as a disposition or necessary condition, but not at all as a potentiality immediately receptive of form.

Finally, they argue thus: if quantity is inherent in matter alone, it follows that it is ingenerable and incorruptible; which seems to be contradictory, since movement in itself is toward quantity. However, we grant the inference, since in fact quantity is incorruptible as regards its own entity, but as regards its various terms it can begin and cease to be, by the conjunction and division of quantity; nor is motion in itself toward the production of quantity, but toward its accretion; and it does not exist by virtue of a new quantity coming into existence in nature, but by virtue of one quantity being subjoined to another, and by the quantity which was alien becoming proper to itself.

I might bring forward other arguments on both sides, but will refrain, to spare you boredom. At this point, then, it is best for me to beat a retreat.

Translation by Phyllis B. Tillyard